THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF SPOUSES
COHABITING WITHOUT MARRIAGE IN
ISRAEL-A COMPARATIVE COMMENTARY
Menashe Shava*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of a man and a woman living together without
marriage has in recent years taken on considerable proportions in
many parts of the globe.' The spread of the phenomenon inevitably has begun to leave its impression on the courts of law, leading
them on more than one occasion to depart from the established
course and settled rules on the related issue of property rights. For2
instance, the Supreme Court of California in Marvin v. Marvin
decided that it was possible, in the absence of an express agreement between the couple and contrary to the rule existing until
then, to found the distribution of property between unmarried parties living together on an implied contract inferrable from their
conduct or on various equitable remedies. The proliferation of the
phenomenon in the United States and the changing attitude of
*LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., Associate Professor in Family Law, Tel-Aviv University (Israel).
On the standing and property rights of unwed couples in different legal systems, see
Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 103-04 (1976); Bruch, Nonmarital Cohabitation in the
Common Law Countries: A Study in Judicial-LegislativeInteraction, 29 Am. J. Comp. L.
217 (1981). As regards the position in various nations, see Pearl, The Legal Implications of
a Relationship Outside Marriage, 37 CAMBIUmD
L.J. 252 (1978) and Deech, The Case
Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation,29 INT'L & Coup. L.Q. 480 (1980) (England);
Pederson, Danish Law Relating to Non-marital Relationships, 28 INT'L & COuP. L.Q. 117,
120-22 (1979) (Denmark); Wade, Trust, The Matrimonial Home and De Facto Spouses, 16
U. TAsmAu
L. REv. 97 (1979) (Australia); Huet-Weiller, 'L'union Libre' (La cohabitation
sans marriage), 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 247 (1981) (France); Sanchez-Cordero, Cohabitation
Without Marriage in Mexico, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 279 (1981) (Mexico); Agell, The Swedish
Legislation on Marriage and Cohabitation:A Journey Without a Destination,29 Am. J.
Co p. L. 285 (1981) (Sweden); Sarcevic, Cohabitation Without Marriage:The Yugoslavian
Experience, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 315 (1981) (Yugoslavia).
3 18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
3 On the prevalence of unwed couples in the United States, see Bruch, PropertyRights of
De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homeakers' Services, 10 FAm. L.Q.
101 n.1 (1976); Nielson, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation,25 HAsTINGS L.J. 1226 n.1 (1974); Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership:A Proposalfor Dividing
the Property of UnmarriedFamilies, 12 WnjuAur
L.J. 453, 456-58 (1976); Kay & Amyx,
Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALmF. L. Rzv. 937, 962 n.153, 975 (1977);
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the public to such unwedded couples greatly influenced the decision in Marvin.4
On the matter of the property rights of unwed couples, the legal
situation in California under the Family Law Act of 19705 is simi-

lar to that in Israel under the Spouses (Property Relations) Law,
1973,6 inasmuch as both enactments apply only to married couples
and consequently leave the question of the property rights of unmarried couples to be determined exclusively according to the case
law. Moreover, the Israeli courts have more than once sought guidance from American rules in the absence of a local statutory arrangement on the subject. 7 This Article will consider the development that has taken place in California law with the reasoning of
Marvin v. Marvin and will reflect on the extent, if any, to which
that rule is likely to influence the property rights of unmarried
partners living together in Israel.
This Article will trace the following aspects: the background of
the phenomenon of unmarried couples in Israel and the factors
motivating the parties to live together on such footing; the wide
recognition given by the Israeli legislature to the institution known
as the "commonly reputed wife" in extending various rights and
benefits to a woman living with her partner in a nonmarital relationship; the expansive interpretation given in the case law to this
institution; the question of the reputed wife's right to maintenance
from her partner; and finally, the rights between unmarried parties
to the property acquired by them while living together, in analogy
with the legal situation resulting from Marvin.
Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation by a Former Spouse Upon His or Her
Right to Continue to Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249, 251 (1979).
' "The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation
that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many." Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, 557
P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1976). On the reasons for the spread of the phenomenon, see Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 962-63; Lorio, Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A
Proposal For a More Perfect Union, 26 Loy. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1980).
* CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800-4812 (West 1970).
Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733 (1973), English translation reprinted in 27
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

313 [hereinafter cited as Spouses Law].

This is done on the presumption of the similarity of laws, when no evidence as to the
foreign law has been offered. The Supreme Court of Israel cited Holmes' judgment in Cuba
Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912), and adopted the rule determined therein.
See Yazdi v. Yazdi, Civ. App. No. 151, 4 P.D. 762, 767 (1949); Marur v. Zorduk, Civ. App.
No. 109, 11 P.D. 904, 905 (1956) ("P.D." refers to Piskei Din which are the reports of the
Supreme Court of Israel). See also M. SHAVA, THE PERSONAL LAW IN ISRAEL 308-25 (1976).
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SPOUSAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL
THE FACTORS MOTIVATING COUPLES IN ISRAEL TO LIVE
TOGETHER OUT OF WEDLOCK

Israeli case law indicates that in practice various reasons influence a couple to live together without going through a recognized
wedding ceremony. This phenomenon has created the institution,
recognized by Israeli law, of the "unmarried wife," also known as
the "commonly reputed wife" or, generally, "reputed spouse."
These reasons may be divided into two main categories.
Since matters of marriage and divorce in Israel are governed by
religious law, the first category refers to the preclusion of a marriage between the parties because of a prohibition in the applicable
religious law. This category includes not only "mixed" couples,
such as a Jew and a Catholic woman, 8 but also cases of Jewish parties whose marriage is impeded by Jewish religious law, such as: a
Kohen (a Jew of priestly descent) and a divorced woman; a woman
whose former marriage, in a religious ceremony, was dissolved
abroad by way of a civil divorce alone;' cases of a woman whose
husband suffers from mental illness, whose whereabouts cannot be
ascertained, the fact of whose death cannot be established, ' or
who unjustifiably refuses to grant her a divorce.' In all these cases
a couple may, for lack of other alternative, choose to live together
in a common household without the bond of a legally recognized
marriage ceremony.
The second category involves those who, despite the absence of
any impediment to marriage, nevertheless choose to live together
out of wedlock for different personal reasons. Sometimes these
may be reasons of principle, such as the couple's objection to the
religious ceremony that their marriage in Israel entails,'2 or their
desire to live together in a free relationship, in whatever form and
without the marriage tie.13 Sometimes the eschewal of the marriage
tie is founded on economic considerations and reluctance to forego
certain material rights, such as pension or provident fund benefits
which are payable to the widow but cease upon her remarriage.
' See Habib v. Kardosh, Civ. App. No. 536, 52 P.M. 213 (1965) ("P.M." refers to Pesakim
Mehoziim which are the reports of the Israeli District Courts).
I See Zemulun v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 73, 20(4) P.D. 645 (1977).
'oSee Yeger v. Palevitz, Civ. App. No. 563, 20(3) P.D. 244 (1965).
See Attorney General v. Yehia, Civ. App. No. 164, 22(1) P.D. 29 (1967).
See, e.g., Aizik r. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 243, 26(2) P.D. 33 (1971).
'• See, e.g., Peretz v. Helmut, Civ. App. No. 4, 20(4) P.D. 337, 356 (1966).
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In discussing the implications of the reputed spouse institution,
the Israeli courts have sought to fathom the legislature's considerations in lending this novel status legal recognition in a long series
of enactments. Three main lines of approach emerge. First, according to the view expressed by Judge Cohn, the legislature's motivation is found in elementary notions of equity and fairness, i.e. preservation of the rights of a woman who, although unmarried, has in
fact fulfilled all the duties of a lawfully wedded wife, regardless of
her reasons for deciding to take this path.14 Another explanation
given in the case law is the legislature's desire to come to the aid of
couples who, although permitted by law to marry, will not do so for
different reasons, including their objection to participating in a religious marriage ceremony as required under the law in Israel or
their wish to live together in a nonmarital relationship of whatever
form. 1 ' A third explanation, more common and accepted than the
former two, is the legislature's wish to ease the situation for
couples who live together out of wedlock because marriage between
them is impeded under the religious law. 6 This factor has been
emphasized in the case law, judges often having noted that the exclusive sway of the religious law in matters of marriage and divorce
sometimes renders the institution of the reputed spouse a "practical necessity in our country."''
III.

THE

"REPUTED SpousE" ENACTMENTS

Israel has witnessed, since the State's establishment, the legislature's increasing recognition of the institution of the reputed
spouse, with particular reference to the extension of various social
rights and benefits. Whenever Israeli enactments use the terms
"spouse," "wife," or "husband," they mean a spouse by virtue of
lawful marriage alone unless the enactments expressly mention
that they include the reputed spouse."8 The number of enactments

" See Israel v. Passler, Civ. App. No. 384, 16(1) P.D. 102, 109 (1961).
IS See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
1'See M. ELON, RzLIGIOUS LEGISLATION 121, 153 (1968); Friedman, The

'Unmarried Wife'

in Israeli Law, 2 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 287, 289-90 (1972); Shava, The 'Unmarried
Wife', 3 IYUNEI MSHPAT 484, 492-94 (1973); Shelah, The Reputed Spouse, 6 MISHPATIM 119,
132-34 (1975).
" Zemulun v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 73, 20(4) P.D. 645, 660 (1977) (Wilkon,
J.). See also Aizik v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 353, 20(3) P.D. 544, 550 (1970);
Aizik v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 243, 26(2) P.D. 33, 51 (1971).
1&See Shava, supra note 16, at 510. See also Steinitz v. Egged Provident Fund, Civ. App.
No. 356, 33(3) P.D. 556, 558 (1978); Levi v. Director of Courts, Civ. App. No. 1, 36(4) P.D.
123, 127-28 (1982).
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in which the reputed spouse is explicitly mentioned stands today
at twenty-three. Most of these statutes confer rights and benefits
on the "woman reputed to be his wife," thereby excluding the reputed husband; only in approximately one-third of these enactments are the rights conferred on both of the parties living together as unwedded "husband and wife."
The social and material rights and benefits conferred by these
enactments relate, inter alia, to pensions, provident funds, and tenants' protection.1 9 An exception is the Succession Law, 1965, because it confers on the surviving reputed spouse rights of succession20 and maintenance out of the deceased partner's estate.2 1 In
conferring these rights, the legislature exceeded the normal reach
in enactments of this character by making available most substantial rights of a kind otherwise stemming only from a legally recognized personal and familial status.
IV.

THE DEFINITION OF "REPUTED SPOUSES" IN THE CASE LAW

The next issue is what a party must prove to be in the category
of "reputed spouse" in order to receive its resultant benefits. This
question was for many years a source of conflicting judicial opinion." Some judges chose a restrictive interpretation, requiring that
the woman seeking recognition as a reputed wife show not only
cohabitation as husband and wife, including the running of a common household, but also that the public believed, albeit mistakenly, that she was lawfully married to that person.23 The judges of
this view accordingly held that if the public knew the woman to be
unmarried to the man whose reputed wife she claimed to be, she
'9 See M. ELON, supra note 16, at 120; Friedman, supra note 16, at 287-88; Shelah, supra
note 16, at 120-28.
'o Succession Law, § 55 (1965), provides:

Where a man and woman though not being married to one another, have lived

together as husband and wife in a common household, then, upon the death of one
of them, neither being then married to another person, the deceased is deemed,
subject to any contrary direction expressed or implied in the will of the deceased,
to have bequeathed to the survivor what the survivor would have inherited on
intestacy if they had been married to one another.
,1 Id. § 57(c) provides:
Where a man and woman, though not being married to one another, have lived

together as husband and wife in a common household, then, upon the death of one
of them, neither being then married to another person, the survivor is entitled to
maintenance out of the estate as if they had been married to each other.
" See Shava, supra note 16, at 494-500.
" See, e.g., Darian v. Amidar, Civ. App. No. 42, 19(3) P.D. 259, 262 (1965) (Halevi, J.);
Aizik v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 243, 26(2) P.D. 33, 49 (1971) (Kahn, J.).
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could not succeed to such title and its resultant benefits. Other
judges inclined toward an expansive interpretation, holding it sufficient for the woman to prove cohabitation and the running of a
common household with her reputed husband and that it made no
difference whether the public thought them to be married to each
other or knew them to be unmarried. 4
The issue was determined in 1973 when the Supreme Court of
Israel, sitting in a special composition of five justices" in the case
of Rosenberg v. Stessel,26 decided three to two' 7 for the expansive

approach. The majority reasoned that the restrictive interpretation
had to be rejected since it promised a reward for those who might
succeed in deceiving or misleading others as to the true situation.
A related issue discussed in the case law is whether a lawfully
married woman may, at the same time, be considered the reputed
wife of another so as to enjoy the concomitant benefits under the
reputed spouse enactments. The issue came before the Israeli Supreme Court in 1962 in the case of Israel v. Pasler." Respondent, a
married woman, began residing with another man, a civil servant
with whom she lived for many years in a common household until
the latter's death. Her claim for benefits as the reputed wife of the
deceased was resisted by the civil service commissioner. The matter reached the Supreme Court, where the State argued that a
married woman could not conceivably be regarded as the reputed
wife of another since this entailed an undermining of the foundations of morality. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that it was possible for a woman to be considered someone's reputed wife, whether or not she was lawfully wedded to another man at the same time.
This decision was strongly criticized by judges and writers.2 For

instance, Justice Kister remarked that the decision amounted to
"an encouragement of those who would break the bond of their
marriage."30 Criticism of the wide recognition of the "reputed
", See, e.g., Zemulun v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 73, 20(4) P.D. 645, 671 (1966)
(Landau, J.); Aizik v. Minister of the Interior, H. Ct. No. 243, 26(2) P.D. 33, 39 (1971)
(Agranat, J.). See also Maza, Common Knowledge and the Common Law Wife, 2 IYUNj
MISHPAT 230 (1972).
" The Supreme Court Bench is usually composed of three Justices.
29(1) P.D. 505 (1973).
" Id. (Etzioni, Sussman, and Witkon, JJ.; against the dissenting opinions of Kahn and
Many, JJ.).
16 P.D. 102 (1962).
" See, e.g., M. ELON, supra note 16, at 122-27.
" See Peretz v. Helmut, Civ. App. No. 4, 20(4) P.D. 337, 357 (1966).
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spouse" institution and its benefits is justified when the parties reputed to be husband and wife are at the same time, either or both,
lawfully married to another, particularly when this is the case with
the reputed wife. Such criticism can be substantiated on three
main grounds. First, unduly wide recognition of the institution
serves to prejudice the purity and stability of family life by encouraging acts of marital infidelity and adultery. It may proliferate
mamzerut (bastardy), particularly when the reputed wife is already married, with all the resultant hardships for the children
born of the union between herself and her reputed spouse.8"
Second, recognition of the institution may result in great hardship for the lawful wife and the children of the marriage. When a
husband abandons his wife to live with another woman now reputed to be his spouse, usually with little consideration shown for
the wifely and household services given to him and the maternal
services given to the children of their marriage, the lawful wife is
not only bereft of any remedy under Israeli law, whether civil or
criminal, 3 but also finds various pecuniary and material benefits
conferred on the reputed spouse, who may well have been responsible for the breakup of the family in the first place. A greater injury
to the abandoned wife and children can hardly be imagined, especially since this may drive her to divorce her husband. Therefore,
the lawful wife needs legislation to protect her against her husband's reputed spouse."
Third, the recognition given the reputed spouse is inconsistent
with the monogamous marriage regime in Israel, a regime accepted
in the civilized world as the foundation for a sound and progressive
society. The Israeli legislature has declared bigamy an offence in
the Penal Law, 1977, section 176 of which provides: "A married
man who marries another woman, or a married woman who marries another man, is liable to imprisonment for a term of five
years." Thus there is created a most anomalous situation. On the
" According to Jewish law, a child born to a married Jewess of a Jewish father other than
her husband is considered a bastard (mamzer), who may not marry a Jew. Since matters of
marriage in Israel are governed exclusively by the personal law, which is Jewish law in the
case of Jews who are citizens of Israel, the situation of a bastard child in Israel becomes an
unenviable one if he should wish to marry.
Adultery constitutes neither a crime nor a civil wrong in Israel.
Itisinteresting to note that a bill to amend the Women's Equal Rights Law, introduced by Knesset Member Ben Meir in 1958 and aimed at ensuring that the reputed
spouses laws would not prejudice the lawful wife's interests, was not adopted. See 23 Dvn
KNgssE" 1187 (1958).
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one hand, a married person who merely goes through a second
marriage ceremony, without actually cohabitating with the new
partner, commits an offence defined as a felony entailing a five
year term of imprisonment. On the other hand, the same person
may actually live together in a common household with his or her
reputed spouse, though carefully refraining from a second marriage
ceremony, and not only escape criminal liability but also receive
the benefits rewarded by the reputed spouse enactments. Accordingly, the Israeli legislature, in the interests of healthy family life,
should address the undesirable effects on the reputed spouse institution caused when one of the partners is already married. Admittedly, the legislature has not been entirely indifferent to the problem because, following Passler," two enactments expressly
provided that the rights conferred on reputed spouses were conditional on neither spouse's being married to another at the time. 5
Yet, the other enactments concerned have remained unchanged,
and the rule in Passler continues to avail the reputed spouse who
is already married to another.
V.

THE

UNWEDDED WIFE AND THE RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE

In Israeli law the unwedded wife has no right to maintenance
from her reputed spouse. The matter is governed by the personal
law," which is the religious law applicable to the parties. For Jews,
who form the majority of the population in Israel, this means Jewish religious law, which denies the unwedded wife a right to maintenance. Moreover, all previous proposals submitted to the Knesset to confer on the unwedded wife a right to maintenance from
her reputed husband have been unsuccessful.8 7
The question arises whether the unwedded wife can establish a
claim for maintenance against her reputed husband by inter vivos
contract whereunder the latter has agreed to be liable for maintenance. The Supreme Court discussed the legality and morality of
such an agreement in Yeger v. Palevitz," in which the majority
upheld the validity of the agreement. Justice Berinson, pronounc" Israel v. Passler, 16 P.D. 102 (1962).

" See Estate Duty (Amendment No. 3) Law, § 2c(a) (1964); Succession Law, §§ 55, 57(c)

(1965).
See Family Law Amendment (Maintenance) Law, § 2 (1959).

" On the other hand, the commonly reputed wife and husband are entitled to maintenance out of the deceased estate of the other, as provided in Succession Law § 57(c) (1965).
For the text of § 57(c), see supra note 21.
" Civ. App. No. 563, 20(3) P.D. 244 (1965).
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ing the majority judgment, held it to be undisputed that in law the
unwedded wife lacked the right to maintenance from her reputed
husband "in the absence of any agreement between them to the
contrary, express or implied."' Addressing the morality of such an
agreement, i.e. the public policy issue, Berinson continued: "An
agreement of the kind contended for, contains nothing that is prohibited, immoral or contrary to public policy even though it be accompanied by cohabitation between the parties and a promise of
future marriage if and when the circumstances so permit ....
VI.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY-THE REPUTED WIFE'S RIGHTS
CONTRASTED WITH THOSE OF THE MARRIED WIFE-

When considering property relations between spouses, it is necessary to distinguish between the legal situation existing in Israel
prior to the effective date of the Spouses Law (and still prevailing
in relation to parties married to each other before January 1, 1974,
in the absence of a property agreement between them) and the legal situation under the Spouses Law which applies only to couples
married after January 1, 1974, the effective date of the Law.
A.

The Legal Situation Prior to the Spouses Law
Prior to the effective date of the Spouses Law, no statutory arrangement existed to govern pecuniary relations between spouses
and the property acquired by them during marriage. The case law
controlling the matter relied on principles of the secular law rather
than on the personal-religious law of the parties."1
Thus, the rules of community property between spouses evolved
from a series of judgments. 2 The law evolving from these cases
" Id. at 248.
" Id. at 249.
" See Briker v. Briker, Civ. App. No. 253, 20(1) P.D. 589, 596 (1965); Azugi v. Azugi, Civ.
App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1, 27 (1977).
"' See Berger v. Director of Estate Duty, Civ. App. No. 300, 19(2) P.D. 240 (1964); Briker
v. Briker, Civ. App. No. 253, 20(1) P.D. 589 (1965); Bareli v. Director of Estate Duty, Civ.
App. No. 135, 23(1) P.D. 393 (1968); Levi v. Goldberg, Civ. App. No. 446, 24(1) P.D. 813
(1969); Afta v. Afta, Civ. App. No. 595, 25(1) P.D. 561 (1969); Ze'evi v. Ze'evi, Civ. App. No.
627, 26(2) P.D. 445 (1970); David v. David, Civ. App. No. 677, 26(2) P.D. 457 (1970); Mastof
v. Mastof, Civ. App. No. 633, 26(2) P.D. 569 (1971); Panouno v. Panouno, Civ. App. No. 66,
29(2) P.D. 181 (1973); Dror v. Dror, Civ. App. No. 264, 32(1) P.D. 829 (1977); Liberman v.
Liberman, Civ. App. No. 630, 35(4) P.D. 359 (1979).
See also Yadin, The Rule in Berger-Briker-Bareli-Also as Against Third Parties?,25
HAPasIrr 442 (1969); Falk, Financial Relations Between Spouses in Israel, 3 IuNaM
MfISHPAT 829 (1974); Proccaccia, Community Property Law in the Bankruptcy of a Spouse,
7 MiSHPATim 266 (1976); Friedmann, Matrimonial Property in Israel, 41 RABELS Z=r-
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will be summarized briefly. First, since the issue of common marital property falls under the law of property, the general rule of
property law that looks to the parties' intention to resolve the ownership question must be applied. This is essentially a factual issue.
Second, unless a contrary intention appears from the mode of the
parties' married life and from their general conduct in pecuniary
and property matters, the presumed intention of a couple living
together amicably for a lengthy period is an equal partnership regarding property acquired during marriage. Hence, when no evidence of a contrary intention exists, property acquired by the joint
effort of the parties will belong to both in equal shares. Harmonious relations between the couple is a precondition to operation of
the partnership presumption. 3 Yet, decisions have qualified this
requirement by holding "harmonious relations" to mean the absence of a split or separation between the parties, as distinct from
the absence of quarrels, however frequent." Only a true estrangement or separation between them would terminate the partnership
presumption. In such an event, the community property presumption ceases to operate only from the date of the estrangement or
separation, so that all property held in common until such time
remains so thereafter.45 Third, the wife's efforts in running the
common household and attending to the welfare of the family, including the children's education, may be regarded as a contribution no less than the husband's efforts, even if unlike the husband
she does not work outside the home and earn an income. The husband's income may accordingly be deemed the fruit of the couple's
joint efforts.4 ' Fourth, a corollary of the general partnership of
property presumption is the presumed joint liability of the parties
for debts incurred by either during the normal course of the partnership. This situation exists as long as the parties continue to
lead a normal family life and have made no contrary agreement

SCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHzs UND INTERNATIONALES PRiVATRECHT

112 (1977); A. ROSEN-ZvI,

THE LAW OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 212-86 (1982).

" See, e.g., Panouno v. Panouno, Civ. App. No. 66, 29(2) P.D. 181, 186-87 (1973).
" See Swirsky v. Swirsky, Civ. App. No. 529, 31(2) P.D. 233, 238 (1976); Dror v. Dror,
Civ. App. No. 264, 32(1) P.D. 829, 831 (1977); Azugi v. Azugi, Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1,
24 (1977).
" See David v. David, Civ. App. No. 677, 26(2) P.D. 457, 464 (1971).
" See Berger v. Director of Estate Duty, Civ. App. No. 300, 19(2) P.D. 240, 246 (1964);
Bareli v. Director of Estate Duty, Civ. App. No. 135, 23(1) P.D. 393, 395-96 (1968); Levi v.
Goldbert, Civ. App. No. 446, 24(1) P.D. 813, 816-17 (1969); Swirsky v. Swirsky, Civ. App.
No. 529, 31(2) P.D. 233, 238 (1976); Azugi v. Azugi, Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1, 20 (1977);
Liberman v. Liberman, Civ. App. No. 630, 35(4) P.D. 359, 365-67 (1979).
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between themselves.4 7 Fifth, the equitable title retained by one
spouse to property within the other's legal ownership is valid and
operative against all others. 8 Sixth, for any immovable property
acquired after January 1, 1970 (which is the effective date of the
Land Law, 1969), the application of the rules of community property will be subject to section 161 of the Land Law which abolishes
any right, including equitable rights, in immovable property except
under statutory law. 49
The following analysis is made on the basis of these six case law
rules on community property between spouses.
1. Exercise of the Co-ownership Right
Since the right to co-ownership of property between spouses is a
proprietary one,50 a spouse may approach the court for realization
of the right in all its implications at any time during the course of
the marriage. It is not necessary to wait until divorce. In many
cases of estranged spouses without divorce, the district court has
declared the wife half-owner of the property acquired by the joint
efforts of the parties during the marriage. 1
2. Application of Community Property Rules to Reputed
Spouses
The central question is whether the community property rules
applicable to spouses, as locally evolved, are also applicable to reputed spouses. Writers on the subject have reached different
conclusions.2
The answer to the question is in the affirmative, provided the
factual circumstances so warrant. That is to say, there must be eviSee, e.g., Levi v. Goldberg, Civ. App. No. 446, 24(1) P.D. 813, 820 (1969); David v.
David, Civ. App. No. 677, 26(2) P.D. 457, 463-64 (1971).
" See Briker v. Briker, Civ. App. No. 253, 20(1) P.D. 589, 597 (1965); Levi v. Goldberg,
Civ. App. No. 446, 24(1) P.D. 813, 819 (1969). But see Kivshani v. Director of Land Betterment Tax, Civ. App. No. 338, 31(3) P.D. 253, 258 (1976) (Kahn, J.).
" See Hashash & Damari v. Damari, Civ. App. No. 514, 31(2) P.D. 505, 510-16, 518
(1976). But see Reichman, Community Property Between Spouses in Light of the Land
Law, 1969, 6 IYuNE MISHPAT 289 (1978).
o See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Briker v. Briker, Civ. App. No. 253, 20(1) P.D. 589 (1965); Ze'evi v. Ze'evi,
Civ. App. No. 627, 26(2) P.D. 445 (1970); Dror v. Dror, Civ. App. No. 264, 32(1) P.D. 829
(1977); Azugi v. Azugi, Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1 (1977).
" See Yadin, supra note 42, at 446; Friedmann, supra note 16, at 302-04; Proccaccia,
supra note 42, at 268, 300; Shifman, PropertyRelations Between Spouses, 11 Is. L. Rxv. 98,
100 (1976); A. RoSEN-ZvI, supra note 42, at 244-46.
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dence both of cohabitation between the parties as husband and
wife in a common household for a prolonged period of time and of
income earned by their joint efforts and of expenses paid out of a
joint fund, though the measure of proof required may possibly be
greater than in the case of lawfully wedded spouses. The reasons to
support this view are several.
First, the rules of marital community property are the product
not of statutory law, which confers the co-ownership right on wedded couples only, but of local case law." Thus, the Spouses Law
grants the right to a balancing of resources only to married partners" regardless of their way of married life or respective efforts in
acquiring their property. In contrast, the presumption of partnership property, as locally evolved, is conditional not on the formal
act of marriage itself, but on the couple's factual cohabitation and
conduct in the manner already indicated. Hence, if the elements
required to apply the partnership presumption to married partners
exist equally when the parties are reputed spouses, there is no reason not to apply the same presumption to reputed spouses as
well.' 5
Second, these community property rules are based on the intent
of the parties." Most precedents held that these rules were
7
founded on an implied agreement between the parties.'
Respondent's claim does not stem from the marriage tie, nor is
it founded on the act of divorce, but is based on the rule of community of property between the couple, as evolved in this court.
The community of property rule is founded on the existence of an
implied agreement between two parties who are living together
and flows from a pooling of their resources. The fact of a tie of
marriage between the two is but a part of the overall complex of
See Afta v. Afta, Civ. App. No. 595, 25(1) P.D. 561, 573 (1969); Liberman v. Liberman,
Civ. App. No. 630, 35(4) P.D. 359, 368 (1979).
" See infra note 95.
" Indeed, in Alovitz v. Karmi, Civ. App. No. 429 (1967) (unpublished opinion), the Supreme Court expressed its willingness, in principle, to apply the rules of co-ownership of
property as developed in the local case law to couples who are commonly reputed to be
spouses.
" See, e.g., Azugi v. Azugi, Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1, 15 (1977).
" See Briker v. Briker, Civ. App. No. 253, 20(1) P.D. 589, 597-99 (1965); Afta v. Afta, Civ.
App. No. 595, 25(1) P.D. 561, 566, 570 (1969); Panouno v. Panouno, Civ. App. No. 66, 29(2)
P.D. 181, 186 (1973); Swirsky v. Swirsky, Civ. App. No. 529, 31(2) P.D. 233, 236 (1976); Dror
v. Dror, Civ. App. No. 264, 32(1) P.D. 829, 831 (1977); Azugi v. Azugi, Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3)
P.D. 1, 15, 17-18, 27 (1977); Cohn v. Cohn, Civ. App. No. 690, 34(2) P.D. 436, 438 (1978);
Liberman v. Liberman, Civ. App. No. 630, 35(4) P.D. 359, 367 (1979).
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factors constituting the agreement and the evidence of its
existence. 58

Therefore, if the community property rules are founded on an implied agreement between married parties living together, equal recognition should be given to such an agreement in the case of reputed spouses living together in the same way.
Third, the Supreme Court of Israel has consulted American case
law on a number of occasions in the absence of local statutory
guidance on a particular issue. 5 ' The Court is likely, therefore, to
be influenced by the recent development in California law in the
area of property distribution between parties living together without marriage, an area governed solely by the case law in both Israel
and California. This particular development was expressed in Marvin v. Marvin" which has already left an impression on the applicable United States case law and literature.'
The case involved a couple who had lived together without marriage for a period of six years in a common household. Upon estrangement between them, the woman sued the man in the Los
Angeles court for enforcement of an alleged oral contract under
which she was entitled to one-half the property acquired during
the time they lived together and which had been registered in his
name. Plaintiff claimed that in October 1964 she and defendant
had entered into an oral agreement to live together. The agreement
provided that while "the parties lived together they would combine
their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all
property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined." The parties further agreed to "hold themselves
out to the general public as husband and wife" and that she would
render her services as "a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and
cook to defendant." Plaintiff added that shortly thereafter she
agreed to "give up her lucrative career as an entertainer [and]
singer" in order to devote her full time to defendant in rendering
him the stated services, in return for which defendant agreed to
"provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the
rest of her life." Plaintiff contended that during the period she
lived with defendant, she fulfilled her obligations under the agreement and that they acquired, by their joint efforts and earnings
Raabi v. Raabi, Civ. App. No. 77, 33(1) P.D. 729, 733 (1977) (Kahn, J.).

" See supra note 7.
18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
6 See infra notes 76-77.

"
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but in defendant's name, various assets, including motion picture
rights worth over one million dollars. Then, in May 1970, defendant compelled her to leave his household, continuing to support
her for a short while and later refusing to do so any further.
Plaintiff's claim for assertion of her rights to community property between the parties was dismissed by the Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, as disclosing no cause of action since the alleged
contract was contrary to public policy and illegal. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of California, and the trial court's
judgment was reversed.
In delivering the majority opinion of the California Supreme
Court, Justice Tobriner noted a significant increase in the last decade in the number of couples living together without marriage. He
accordingly considered it opportune, in view of the conflicting
opinions in the case law on the subject, to examine closely the
principles that guided the distribution of property acquired by an
unwed couple while living together.
In rejecting the argument that the agreement was immoral, the
Court remarked:
The fact that a man and woman live together without marriage,
and engage in a sexual relationship, does not in itself invalidate
agreements between them relating to their earnings, property, or
expenses. Neither is such an agreement invalid merely because
the parties may have contemplated the creation or continuation
of a nonmarital relationship when they entered into it. Agreements between nonmarital partners fail only to the extent that
they rest upon a consideration of meretricious sexual services."
The Court added that, in laying down the rule that an agreement between nonmarital partners was enforceable unless explicitly and inseverably based on the consideration of meretricious
sexual services, it was providing the parties, as well as the courts,
with a practical yardstick for determining when an agreement between unwed couples of the kind in question is enforceable. Hence,
by this test, the agreement was undoubtedly enforceable since it
was not founded on any illegal consideration. Justice Tobriner
summarized the Court's view on this point as follows:
In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults
who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are
Marvin v. Marvin, 1 Cal3d 660, 670-71, 557 P.2d 106, 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822

(1976).
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nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract re-

specting their earnings and property rights. Of course, they cannot lawfully contract to pay for the performance of sexual services, for such a contract is, in essence, an agreement for

prostitution and unlawful for that reason. But they may agree to
pool their earnings and to hold all property acquired during the
relationship in accord with the law governing community prop-

erty; conversely they may agree that each partner's earnings and
the property acquired from those earnings remains the separate
property of the earning partner. So long as the agreement does

not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may
order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements."
Justice Tobriner likewise reviewed the case law concerning the

situation in which no express agreement between nonmarital partners exists. Comparing the cases up to 1973," the date of the Cary
decision," with those decided later, Justice Tobriner noted a lack
of consistent approach in the earlier decisions." Two rules nevertheless remained common to, and were applied in, all of these

cases. The first rule was a refusal by the courts to infer an implied
agreement from the conduct of the parties. The second rule was a
determination by the courts that in the absence of an express
agreement between the parties, the services and contribution of
one of them toward the running of the joint household and the
raising and education of their children did not serve to confer on
such party any right to property acquired by the other while they

lived together. 67 Neither of these rules, however, escaped strong
criticism by writers'

as well as judges."

Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
See, e.g., Vallera v. Valera, 21 Cal.2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943); Keene v. Keene, 57
Cal.2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962). On the attitude reflected in the case law
until 1973, see Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the
Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 F M. L.Q. 101, 106-14; Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at
938-45; Larson, Disposition of Property Upon Termination of Nonmarital Cohabitation,53
WASH. L. REv. 145, 146-52 (1977).
In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App.3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
" "Thus in summary, the cases prior to Cary exhibited a schizophrenic inconsistency."
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d at 678, 557 P.2d at 118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
7 "[T]he cases apparently held that a nonmarital partner who rendered services in the
absence of express contract could assert no right to property acquired during the relationship." Id. at 679, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
" See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 64, at 106-14; Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 938-45; Nielson, supra note 3, at 1239-46; Larson, supra note 64, at 146-52.
" See Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal.2d 681, 686-87, 134 P.2d 761, 764 (1943) (Curtis, J.);
Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal.2d 657, 672, 371 P.2d 329, 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 602 (1962) (Peters,
U
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In 1973, the Cary decision changed this situation.7 0 The case involved an unmarried couple who lived together in a common
household for a period of eight years. They held themselves out to
their friends and acquaintances as husband and wife, raised four
children, bought a house and other property, and generally acted
as a married couple for all intents and purposes, with the man
working outside the home and the woman taking care of the home
and children. Upon the man's application for a declaration as to
the "nullity of the marriage" in 1971, the court awarded the woman one-half of the property which was acquired while they lived
together and which was paid for entirely out of the man's earnings.
The judgment was affirmed on appeal. The court ascribed its departure from the existing rule to the influence of the Family Law
Act of 1970, since this Act indicated a legislative policy entitling a
party living together with another in a common household without
marriage to one-half of the assets acquired during their relationship. 1 Subsequent decisions of the court of appeals on this aspect
have lacked uniformity, some following the stated precedent,
others expressing reservations. 2
In Marvin, Justice Tobriner dealt with this difference in opinion
by disavowing Cary's imputation of legislative policy from the
Family Law Act. Justice Tobriner held that this Act had no bearing on the issue because the question of property rights between
unmarried partners had to be determined solely according to judicial decision, just as before enactment of the Family Law Act, since
the latter introduced no change on this matter. The judge did,
however, accept on its merits the criticism of the earlier precedents
expressed in Cary, according to which the distribution of property
between nonmarital partners was an inequitable one. In his view,
the court, when dealing with the property rights of unmarried
partners, should be guided by the presumption that "the parties
intend to deal fairly with each other.

'78

J.).
TO In

re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App.3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).

1 See Nielson, supra note 3; Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 945-54; Larson, supra note

64, at 152-56.
" See, e.g., Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App.3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975); Beckman v.
Mayhew, 49 Cal. App.3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975).
"' Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 830 (1976)
(Tobriner, J.). See also Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 962-68; Comment, Property Rights
Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation,90 HARv. L. REv. 1708, 1715 (1977). "Justice Tobriner stated that the best presumption is that unmarried cohabitants intended to
deal fairly with each other. This may provide the basis for a broad application of Marvin,
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We add that in the absence of an express agreement, the courts
may look to a variety of other remedies in order to protect the
parties' lawful expectations. The courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership
or joint venture .. .or some other tacit understanding between
the parties. The courts may, when appropriate, employ principles
of constructive trust . . . or resulting trust . . . Finally, a
nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable
value of support received if he can show that
he rendered services
71
with the expectation of monetary reward. '
The supreme court's decision was widely reported in the press.
It also had an immediate impact on subsequent cases, 76 became the

subject of lively discussion in law journals,7 and may well influwhich would permit recovery whenever it can be established that the de facto spouse was
treated unfairly." Id.
" Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23, 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831-32
(1976). Chief Justice Wright and Justices McComb, Mosk, Sullivan, and Richardson concurred in the judgment of Tobriner. Justice Clark agreed with the result, holding that the
appeal was to be upheld and that the plaintiff was permitted to prove her claim on the basis
of an agreement, express or implied. Justice Clark believed, however, that the opinion
should have stopped at that point,
When the parties to a meretricious relationship show by express or implied in
fact agreement they intend to create mutual obligations, the courts should enforce
the agreement. However, in the absence of agreement, we should stop and consider the ramifications before creating economic obligations which may violate legislative intent, contravene the intention of the parties, and surely generate undue
burdens on our trial courts.
Id. at 123-24. For further results of the case, see Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App.3d 871, 176
Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
'0 See, e.g., 50-50 Rights for Unwed Couples, Big Ruling on Unmarried Couples, etc.,
TtmE, Oct. 1, 1977, at 39. "The landmark decision, handed down last week, states that cohabitation without marriage gives both parties the right to share property if they separate."
Id. See also Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 954 n.104.
74A similar trend to the approach of the California Supreme Court in Marvin is found in
the case law of various states. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 14 Wash. App. 397, 402-03,
541 P.2d 1243, 1247 (1975); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Latham v.
Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978);
McCullon v. McCullon, 96 Misc.2d 962, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979).
See, e.g., Kay & Amyx, supra note 3, at 954-73; Comment, supra note 73; Larson,
supra note 64, at 156-69; Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status
to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. Rzv. 47, 62 n.56 (1979); Oldham, supra note 3, at
268-72; Lesnek, Property Rights of UnmarriedCohabitants, 23 WAYNz L. Rav. 1305 (1977);
Ward, In a Suit For Settlement of Property Rights Upon Termination of a Cohabitation
Arrangement, 46 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 924 (1977); Comment, Property Rights of Unmarried
Cohabitatorson Dissolution of the Relationship,30 OKLA. L. Rav. 494 (1977); Reggie, Un-
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ence the Supreme Court of Israel in its treatment of the question
of partnership property between reputed spouses. For all of the
reasons indicated above, there would seem to be no obstacle to applying the rules which have evolved in Israel concerning commuhusband and wife to parties living together
nity property between
78
spouses.
as reputed
B.

The Legal Situation in Israel under the Spouses Law

As already indicated, property relations between spouses now
are governed in Israel by the Spouses Law, which came into force
on January 1, 1974. 79 This law restricts the application of a resources-balancing arrangement, provided for in sections 3-10 of its
second chapter, to couples who married after the effective date.
This resources-balancing arrangement supercedes the case law
rules of community property with respect to spouses.8 0 For couples
who married prior to the effective date of the law, the aforesaid
community property rules continue to apply81 in the absence of a
valid property agreement between the couple (confirmed by the
District Court or the competent religious court). 82 The law provides civil-territorial directives which are applicable to all parties,
irrespective of religion or nationality, provided they are domiciled
in Israel at the time of celebration of their marriage.8
Pursuant to section 3 of the Spouses Law, where the spouses
have not made a property agreement regulating property relations
between them or
where they have made such an agreement, in so far as it does not
otherwise provide, they shall be regarded as having agreed to a
married Couples May Contract For Community Property Regime, 52 TuL. L. Rav. 188
(1977); Slade, Marvin v. Marvin: An Extension of Remedies to Protect the Rights of the
Meretricious Spouse, 10 Sw. U.L. Rzv. 699 (1978); Mitchelson & Glucksman, Equal Protection For UnmarriedCohabitors: An Insider's Look at Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PmEP'RDINZ L.
REv. 283 (1978); Note, Non-Marital Cohabitation,16 J. FAm. L. 331 (1978); Fernandez, Beyond Marvin: A ProposalFor Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. RaV. 359 (1978); Lorio,
supra note 4, at 20-21; Comment, Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants,62 MINN. L.
REv. 449, 454-65 (1978); Grant & Hyink, Caveat Amator: 'The State of Affairs' in Illinois
After Hewitt v. Hewitt, 29 DEPAuL L. RaV. 493, 498-519 (1980).
See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text.
See Spouses Law, supra note 6, § 19.
' See Friedmann, supra note 42, at 124, 142; A. RoSEN-ZVI, supra note 42, at 286-94. But
see Shifman, supra note 52, at 98; Proccaccia, supra note 42, at 298-301.
"' Azugi v. Azugi, Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1, 5 (1977).
' This valid agreement is defined in accordance with Spouses Law, supra note 6, §§ 1-2.
"Spouses Law, supra note 6, § 15. For comments on this section, see Shava, Marital
Property in Conflict of Laws, 6 Lvuzim IsHPAT 247, 268-88 (1978).
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resources-balancing arrangement in accordance with this chapter
[chapter two of the Spouses Law], and this arrangement shall be
regarded as having been agreed upon by a valid property agreement conforming to the provision of section 2."

A "resources-balancing agreement" means that each of the spouses
is entitled to one-half of the value of the aggregate property of the

spouses, 8 ' except property the value of which shall not be balanced
between the spouses."6

The crucial question is the stage at which a spouse may exercise
the right to a balancing of resources. Under the community property rules it is possible, as already indicated, for a spouse to apply

to court at any time during the existence of the marriage for a declaration as to his half-ownership of the property acquired by the
joint efforts of the parties. 7

The Spouses Law gives an unequivocal answer to this question.
Section 5(a) provides that the resources-balancing arrangement

may be implemented" only upon dissolution of the marriage by
divorce or by the death of one of the spouses"se Until such event,
completely separate ownership of property between the spouses
will be observed, in that each spouse is capable of exclusive acqui-

sition and full retention of separate proprietary rights.90 FurtherSpouses Law, supra note 6, § 3. According to §1 of the Spouses Law, "[a]n agreement
between spouses regulating property relations between them... and any variation of such
an agreement shall be in writing." Section 2(a) requires "confirmation by the District Court
...
or the religious court which has jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce of the
spouses .... ." "Where a property agreement is made before the marriage or at the time of
solemnization thereof, authentication by the marriage registrar may take the place of confirmation by the civil or religious court." Id. § 2(c).
"See id. §§ 5-6. But see id. §8 which grants the court special powers to distribute the
property differently in certain circumstances. On the problem of resources-balancing between the spouses, see Tedeschi, Resources Balancing Arrangement Between Spouses, 30
HAPRAxLr 76 (1975).
" This is specified in Spouses Law, supra note 6, § 5(a), as follows:
(1) property which they had immediately before the marriage or received by
way of gift or inheritance during the marriage;
(2) rights which by virtue of the law are not transferable;
(3) property in respect of which the spouses have agreed in writing that its value
shall not be balanced between them.
" See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
" See Panouno v. Panouno, Civ. App. No. 66, 29(2) P.D. 181, 183 (1973); Azugi v. Azugi,
Civ. App. No. 2, 33(3) P.D. 1, 31 (1977).
" Spouses Law, supra note 6, § 5(a). In the case of a termination of the marriage in
consequence of the death of one of the spouses, "his place shall for the purposes of the
balancing of resources be taken by his heirs." Id. § 5(b).
"0 Spouses Law, supra note 6, § 4 provides that "[tihe contraction or existence of the
marriage shall not by itself affect any ownership rights of the spouses, confer on one of them
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more, until termination of the marriage for reasons of divorce or
death alone, the right to a balancing of resources is not only kept
in abeyance between the parties, but also placed beyond transaction with third parties or the reach of creditors."
This seems to be the main shortcoming of the Spouses Law. Section 5 precludes the right to a balancing of resources in many situations, including cases of separation between the parties, even if
prolonged and even if by agreement or by a separation order, and
cases of annulment of marriage, whether the marriage be void ab
initio or merely voidable. Therefore, it is questionable whether a
resources-balancing arrangement will apply to members of the
Catholic Christian community whose faith does not recognize the
possibility of divorce since they would be unable to make a property agreement as defined in the Spouses Law.
Moreover, even the Jewish law of divorce renders practical exercise of the right to a balancing of resources between Jewish spouses
problematic since it holds divorce to be an act of mutual consent
between husband and wife." Unlike other legal systems, Jewish
law does not recognize divorce as being constituted by a judicial
decision putting an end to the marriage tie. Thus a "judgment for
divorce" given by the Rabbinical Court at the wife's instance,
binding or even coercing the husband to give her a get (bill of divorce), is not a constitutive judgment dissolving the marriage, but
is merely intended to put pressure on the husband to give the divorce to his wife. As long as the husband has not given the get of

rights in property of the other or impose on one of them liability for debts of the other."
" Id. § 10 stipulates that "[s]o long as the marriage has not terminated, the right of a
spouse to the balancing of resources cannot be transferred, charged or attached."
9 See M. SunJmEG, PERSONAL STATUS IN ISRAEL 95-122, 348 (1958); B. SCHERESCHEWSKV,
FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL 272-76 (2d ed. 1967); Z. FALK, THE DIvORcE ACTION By THE WIFE IN
JEWISH LAW 40-48 (1973); Shava, The Spouses (PropertyRelations) Law 1973 in Light of
Religious Divorce in Israel, 2 TEL-Avrv U. STUD. IN L. 113, 116-23 (1976). See also
Volkenberg v. Volkenberg, Civ. App. No. 22, 2 Pal. L. Rep. 365-66 (1934), in which Justice
Frumkin explains that:
[dlivorce under Jewish Law is an act of mutual consent contracted between hus-

band and wife and supervised by Rabbinical authorities only so far as necessary to
secure that all requirements of Jewish Law in this respect have been fully ob-

served. In any dispute between husband and wife as regards a divorce the
Rabbinical Court can only decide whether or not the husband is bound to divorce
his wife and whether or not the wife is bound to accept a divorce from her husband. With the issue of an order to that effect, the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical

Court as such ceases ....There is no divorce and no dissolution of marriage unless and until the husband has by his own will granted the divorce in the form
prescribed by religious authorities (a form which has practically not changed for

the last 2,000 years), and.. .the wife has by her own will accepted such divorce.
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his free will, or the wife received the same of her free will, the
couple will be deemed still married. The customary practice among
Jews is for the party seeking a divorce to persuade his spouse to
consent thereto, and this is sometimes achieved by the grant of
pecuniary and property rights to the latter. Such mutual consent
will be followed by and expressed in a divorce agreement regulating all outstanding issues between the parties, such as custody of
the minor children, maintenance, and distribution of the common
property between them. This practice is recognized and approved
in the Spouses Law, section 2(d) of which provides: "An agreement
between spouses confirmed by a judgment for divorce of a religious
court shall be treated as a property agreement confirmed under
this section."
It may therefore be asked how the wife seeking a divorce from
her husband is to secure her right to a balancing of resources when
the latter can frustrate this right by his refusal to give her a divorce, without which the right does not come into play.9" It would
seem that the wife whose husband conditions his willingness to
give her a divorce on a waiver of her right to a balancing of resources and perhaps on other pecuniary concessions on her part
will have little choice but to accede to her husband's demands.'
Therefore, it is clear that the situation of a married woman
under the Spouses Law is worse than it was under the rules of
community property between spouses. Moreover, because the
Spouses Law is applicable only to lawfully wedded parties,"9 the
distribution of property between reputed spouses remains governed by the locally evolved community property rules," which
formerly applied to wedded and unwedded couples alike. The
astonishing result is that the reputed wife is in a better situation
regarding the distribution of property than is a married woman
under the Spouses Law.

'3

See M. SHAVA, supra note 7, at 188-89.
Compare this situation with Green v. Green, Civ. App. No. 457, 16 P.D. 318 (1961) and

Attorney-General v. Yehia, Civ. App. No. 164, 22(1) P.D. 29 (1967). See also Falk, supra
note 42, at 848; Tedeschi, supra note 85, at 98.
" This conclusion may be drawn both from the fact that the legislature employs the term

"spouses" without stating that it includes commonly reputed spouses (see supra note 18 and
accompanying text) and from the fact that language used in many sections of the same law
explicitly shows that the term applies solely to couples married according to law. E.g.,
Spouses Law, supra note 6, §§ 2(c), 4, 5(a), 10, 14, 15. See also Zur v. Attorney-General, 2

P.M. 400 (1975) (Harish, J., judgment on Motion 2180/75).
"See

supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The question of the property rights of unmarried parties living
together in Israel has yet to be decided by the Supreme Court of
Israel. In this connection the important decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Marvin v. Marvin, as yet undiscussed and
unmentioned in the Israeli case law, is likely to exert considerable
influence. The Spouses Law, which regulates the property relations
between spouses in Israel, applies only to married couples, leaving
the similar relations between unmarried couples who are known in
Israel as "reputed spouses" governed by the case law. In this respect the legal situation in Israel is comparable to that which
prevails in California, where the provisions of the Family Law Act
of 1970 govern the property relations between married couples
alone, such relations between unmarried couples remaining under
the control of the case law, as was held in the Marvin case.
This article has shown that there is no obstacle in Israel to applying the rules of community property between spouses, as developed in the local case law, to reputed spouses, provided that the
circumstances so warrant. Israeli courts should apply community
property rules when the parties have cohabited with each other for
a prolonged period, have run a common household, and have
pooled their earnings and expenditures, even though the measure
of proof required for the operation of these rules may be greater
than in the case of lawfully wedded couples. It is submitted that a
claim brought by a woman and based on community property between herself and her reputed spouse with whom she has lived
under such circumstances as mentioned above will be entertained
by the Israeli court to the extent of one-half of the property jointly
acquired by the couple during the period of their cohabitation.
This result is dictated by the fact that the case law holds the rules
of community property between spouses to be founded on an implied contract between the parties, from which contract there is no
reason to exclude unmarried partners who are "reputed" spouses
who have been living together in harmony for an extended period
of time.
The decision in Marvin v. Marvin may influence the Israeli
courts and guide them in the direction of a similar extension of the
community property doctrine to unmarried couples who live together in the manner indicated. The detailed reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Marvin, in relation to the situation of unmarried couples, has equal validity in the Israeli context where the
phenomenon of the unwedded couple is just as widespread. The
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Israeli case law, moreover, has more than once been influenced and
guided by important American legal decisions on issues not covered by any local statutory arrangement. In addition, the Israeli
Supreme Court has already held that a maintenance agreement between reputed spouses "contains nothing that is prohibited, immoral or contrary to public policy even though it be accompanied
"
by cohabitation between the parties ....
A comparison between the property rights of a married woman
under the Spouses Law, 1973, with those of a reputed wife under
the rules of the community property reveals that the reputed wife
is in a better legal situation in Israel today regarding the community of property than is her wedded counterpart. This is submitted
to be an intolerable result, one which the Israeli legislature would
do well to correct by amendment of the Spouses Law.
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